On Lunes & Cracks

Conserving St Peter’s Basilica

The dome of St Peter’s Basilica in Rome is one of the most recognised structures in the world. It was completed around 1590 and was conceived by the genius Michelangelo. There are many reasons why it is special structure, but perhaps the most important is amongst the least well known.

By around 1680 cracks were being reported in the dome, which unsurprisingly caused some to question its safety. Concerns were exacerbated following an earthquake in 1730. Meridional cracking, associated with a dome’s tendency to spread at the base, was well known in the sixteenth century and therefore, following a detailed investigation, a recommendation was made to supplement the existing wrought iron hoops, which were intended to prevent spreading, with three or four more.

It would seem that the Vatican had travelled a distance since Galileo’s heresy trial and the incumbent Pope Benedict XIV, unlike many designers and practitioners of the day, was impressed by the progress made by scientists and mathematicians of the day. He therefore commissioned three of them; Thomas Seur, Francois Jacquier & Roggiero Boscovich to examine the subject. The publication of their findings in 1743 was a seminal moment for Structural Engineering, because they had based their conclusions on a mathematical analysis of the dome. It was the first known occasion when this was done in any meaningful way. Their approach included a model of the dome’s weight, its materials and two different behavioural scenario’s. The method they adopted for combining this information would today be called ‘virtual work’.

They concluded that the existing iron rings embedded within the dome were insufficient to prevent spreading and that the dome would collapse. They therefore proceeded to calculate the number and proportions of additional rings. This was of course a safe recommendation, however it overlooked the rather important fact that the dome had not in fact collapsed and was very much still standing.

Though they were three of the smartest mathematicians of their day they had made the same basic error that almost every graduate engineer makes at some point. They had placed their confidence in their model over what they could see with their eyes. One of the most important truisms of structural engineering is that a structure will remain in place until it has exhausted every possible means of standing. Consequently, if a mathematical model says a structure will collapse, but it stubbornly refuses to do so, then one is obliged to conclude that the model is wrong and not reality.

The presiding committee responsible for the church’s upkeep did what committees often do. They ignored the expert report and continued to monitor the structure. Benedict was also dissatisfied, but wished to persevere with a scientific approach. He commissioned a new study by a different expert Giovanni Poleni. 

Poleni criticised aspects of the first report and tackled the problem with a different approach. While he conceived his own mathematical model, Poleni was also aware of Robert Hooke’s work on the stability of arches, which is described in an earlier post [On Balloons, Chains and Arches]. He therefore imagined the dome to be split into a series of lunes each of which rested against an opposing lune on the other side of the dome. He then used a physical model to demonstrate that the line of thrust for a pair of lunes lay within the depth of their cross section and would therefore meet Hooke’s criteria for a stable arch. By this reasoning the whole dome, being a series of balanced lunes, would be stable in spite of its meridional cracks.

Nevertheless, Poleni also recommended four additional wrought iron hoops, which were installed in 1744. A further hoop was added in 1747, when it was discovered that one of the originals had in fact fractured.

While the application of mathematics to structural engineering problems, which was pioneered by Seur, Jacquier and Roggiero, would prove successful in the long run it is not difficult to see why it was unsuccessful to begin with. 

While mathematicians and scientists had been publishing treatise on engineering subjects from the early eighteenth century, architects and engineers of the day were unacquainted with mathematical argument and treatise were therefore largely ignored.

A second, and perhaps more significant issue, was the relative maturity of the respective disciplines. Eighteenth century mathematical models, though brilliant in their conception, were no match for 1,000 years of engineering experience, which had refined and optimised known structural forms about as much as it was possible. The only conceivable  advantage for science would be for the conception of structures for which there was no precedent.

This dichotomy caused a divergence in engineering practise between Britain and its European neighbours. While France and Germany forged ahead with academic schools of engineering Britain largely adopted an empirical approach. Unsurprisingly the continental Europeans produced more impressive academic works, however Britain prospered with its empirical approach, which produced closer alignment with the real world and therefore greater efficiency.

Britain’s engineers did not dismiss theoretical works, because they were less intelligent or less capable. They simply knew that the best academic theories of the day could not get close to matching the empirical approach they were pioneering.

There is a lesson in this for the modern engineer. Modern codes of practise are becoming increasingly academic and less practical. It is not clear to this engineer that the additional effort required to use them yields a justifiable benefit. I am also quite certain that as in the eighteenth century some modern methods are less efficient than the empirical methods they have replaced.

In some circles our profession needs to rediscover the once obvious truth that a theory, which does not match past empirical experience, is not a good theory.....particularly when it is more complex to use than its predecessor.